讲座题目：When Should Restaurants Subsidize Online Platforms? The Impact of Delivery Agents

主讲人：陈　忠  教授

主持人：艾兴政  教授

时　间：2023年9月25日（星期一）  上午10:15

地　点：电子科技大学清水河校区，经管楼C101

主讲人简介：

陈忠，华东师范大学经济与管理学部助理教授。浙江大学管理学学士，香港中文大学商学博士，并曾在浙江大学管理学院从事博士后工作。研究兴趣包括运营管理与市场营销的交叉研究、新兴技术（区块链、AI）在运营管理中的应用、农产品供应链管理等。研究成果发表于Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research, Omega-the International Journal of Management Science等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目，并参与多项面上及科技部重点研发项目。

讲座简介：

Problem definition: Restaurants can provide catering services to customers through the traditional offline channel or online food delivery platforms. Platforms claim they deserve to receive a positive commission fee from restaurants as they help restaurants expand their market and gain access to more customers. In contrast, some restaurants complain that platforms' commission fees make it difficult to operate profitably. In this study, we are trying to identify when restaurants should offer such commission fees to subsidize food delivery platforms. Methodology/results: We build a game-theoretic model that accounts for the interactions among the four parties involved in a three-sided food delivery market, i.e., the restaurant, the platform, customers, and food delivery agents. Demands are assumed to be sensitive to both the price and delivery time. The objective of both the restaurant and the food delivery platform is to maximize their operating profits. We uncover conditions under which the restaurant should pay a commission fee to the platform. We show that a high wage rate for delivery agents makes the restaurant subsidize the platform, allowing it to post competitive service terms for online customers. We also investigate how the delivery agents' self-scheduling characteristic affects all parties' operational decisions. In particular, we show that the platform could benefit from an increase in the minimum wage for delivery agents as any increase in the minimum wage increases the efficient demand for each delivery agent. Interestingly, the restaurant is indifferent to changes in the minimum wage. Finally, while the restaurant usually implements surge pricing, the platform might reduce both its delivery fees and quoted lead time to dampen the effect of a surge in the restaurant's food price. Managerial implications: Both the restaurant and the platform can benefit from a commission contract if the wage rate for delivery agents is not low. Platforms can benefit from an increase in the minimum wage as a higher minimum wage can motivate these agents to exert more delivery effort. The restaurant should implement surge pricing, while the platform should be mindful of implementing surge pricing.

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供应链与服务管理研究所

2023年9月20日